We examine a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding. The main innovation is that we assume that the crowding effects of agents are a result of choices that agents make. For example, agents may be crowded (positively or negatively) by the skills that other members of their jurisdiction possess and these skills may be acquired through utility maximizing educational investment choices made in response to equilibrium wages and educational costs. In such an environment, we show that taste-homogeneous jurisdictions are optimal. This contrasts with results for both the standard differentiated crowding model and the crowding types model. We also show that the core and equilibrium are equivalent, and that decentralization is possible through anonymous prices having a structure similar to cost-share equilibrium prices.
Introduction
The key insight of Tiebout (1956) is that while people have an incentive to form groups in order to share the cost of public goods, this incentive might be limited by the negative external effects that agents impose on one another. In such an environment, agents break up into jurisdictions smaller than the entire population in order to efficiently provide themselves with public goods. Tiebout speculated that competition between these jurisdictions would induce agents to "vote with their feet" by choosing the jurisdiction that offered the best available mix of public goods and cost shares.
Agents would thereby reveal their preferences, causing the free rider problem to disappear and the outcome to be efficient.
A second insight of Tiebout's classic paper is that placing agents with a different taste in the same jurisdiction is likely to lead to conflict and inefficiency. There is a strong intuition that jurisdictions in which all agents agree on the most preferred mix of public goods can make their members better off than jurisdictions in which there is disagreement and agents are forced to reach a compromise. For example, a city in which half the citizens like parks and half like schools may only be able to provide half the levels of each of these two goods that it is possible for cities of the same size containing only one type of citizen to offer. In economies in which crowding is anonymous in the sense that agents are affected only by the numbers of agents with whom they share the collective goods, this intuition is essentially correct. Wooders (1978) shows that when small groups are effective, † all jurisdictions in core states of an economy will be demand-homogeneous. Demandhomogeneity means that all individuals in a jurisdiction will have the same demands for congestion and for public goods, although they may have different tastes. ‡ While this is not the same as taste-homogeneity, it does imply that taste-heterogeneous jurisdictions can never Pareto dominate those which are taste-homogeneous (although in some cases they may do exactly as well). We will say that such jurisdictions are essentially taste-homogeneous.
More generally, the external effects that one agent has on another may be positive or negative, may be felt through production or consumption and, in particular, may depend on an agent's type. When agents care not only about the number of agents in their jurisdiction but also about their types, crowding is said to be differentiated. The optimality of homogeneous jurisdictions in differentiated crowding economies is much less clear. For example, if agents of type 1 are men, agents of type 2 are women, and the public good is a Saturday night dance, we would expect to see agents of both types mixing together in optimal jurisdictions (dance halls). It is not difficult to imagine any number of similar situations in which optimal jurisdictions are heterogeneous.
A reason for the optimality of heterogeneous jurisdictions is that there may be complementarities between the crowding effects of agents-the effects of agents on each other. In the standard differentiated crowding model an agent's type defines both his tastes and his crowding effects. § We have argued elsewhere (see † See the definition in Section 2. ‡ See also Berglas and Pines (1980) , Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) and Barham and Wooders (1996) for related results.
§ See, for example, Berglas (1976) , Wooders (1981 Wooders ( , 1989 Wooders ( , 1993a or Scotchmer (1994) . Conley & Wooders, 1995a) that there is no reason to tie an agent's preferences to his external effects on others. One advantage to separating taste and crowding effects is that it allows us to define prices that depend only on observable crowding types. It is then possible to show that agents can be induced to sort themselves into an efficient pattern of jurisdictions in response to prices that are anonymous in the sense that they do not depend on agents' preferences. This extension of Tiebout's basic decentralization hypothesis cannot be obtained with the standard form of differentiated crowding since in such models prices must depend on tastes.
Another advantage to the crowding types model is that it allows us to study the optimality of taste-homogeneous jurisdictions when crowding is differentiated. For example, we can ask if Saturday night dances will be attended by people who all like the same types of music (have the same taste type) but by agents of both genders (of different crowding types). † The strong intuition from the anonymous crowding literature is that optimal jurisdictions in a crowding types model should be (essentially) taste-homogeneous. It is possible to take advantage of the full array of crowding effects without having to compromise with agents who have different tastes. It is surprising, therefore, that this turns out not to be true. In Conley and Wooders (1995b) we show that even when small groups are effective and there are many agents of each type, it may still be that optimal jurisdictions are taste-heterogeneous.
Since the optimality of taste-heterogeneous jurisdictions is so counter-intuitive, it is natural to wonder if there are conditions under which taste-homogeneity can be recovered. We show in Conley and Wooders (1995b) that the hedonic independence of agents' characteristics is one such sufficient condition. Hedonic independence means that the utility an agent receives in a core state can be explained solely as wages paid separately to his crowding and taste characteristics. In particular, there is no advantage or disadvantage to having any given combination of characteristics. Thus, the value of an agent's taste and crowding characteristics are independent. The problem with hedonic independence is that it is not generally satisfied in crowding type models. In fact, it may even be generically false. This leaves us without an explanation for why taste-homogeneous coalitions seem to be so common in everyday experience.
The major innovation in this paper is that we dispense with the assumption that crowding type is an exogenously given characteristic of agents. Exogeneity is appropriate when crowding type represents something like gender, height, intelligence or some other genetic endowment. It might also be acceptable when an † In the standard differentiated crowding model, it was impossible even to express such a question. agent's crowding type is a result of past and irreversible decisions, such as the choice to become a doctor or learn a language. On the other hand, it is clear that many characteristics which affect the welfare of others are the result of choices that agents make in response to market and other signals. For example, different types of economists provide different external benefits to their departments. Optimal departments have a mix of theorists, econometricians, macroeconomists and other specialties. Nobody, however, is born a macroeconomist (at least we hope not). Graduate students observe which fields are most in demand and so forth and then choose a specialty. This same type of decision making goes on at all levels of the labour and education markets, and even beyond. For example, people choose to get married, have children, become community leaders, own dogs, etc., at least partly in response to costs and benefits they can expect to receive as a result of providing their community with the associated negative or positive external effects.
In this paper, we explore the effect of letting the crowding type of an agent be an endogenous characteristic which is chosen by agents in the context of an optimization model. To be concrete, we will discuss this in terms of agents facing a schedule of educational costs in order to acquire particular types of skills. There is nothing in the formal statement of the model, however, that excludes other types of decision-making. For example, married people may provide different types of externalities than single people, and it may cost something (search costs, perhaps) to become married.
We show that when agents choose their own crowding types, market forces make it impossible for any combination of tastes and crowding characteristics to have a utility generating value in excess of their independent market values. In other words, hedonic independence necessarily obtains as a result of agents' optimizing choice. This in turn implies that the core is taste-homogeneous. It also implies that there will exist anonymous decentralizing prices with a special, and very intuitive, structure. Specifically, the price that an agent who chooses to acquire a given crowding type pays to join a jurisdiction with a certain profile of crowding characteristics and bundle of public goods will equal the average cost of providing the public goods plus the difference between the average education expenditures in this jurisdiction and his own educational expenditure.
The model
We consider a one private good, M public goods economy with I agents indexed iv{1, . . ., I}oI. Each agent can be one of T different types, indexed tv{1, . . ., T}oT. →R. Thus, the utility an agent ivI with tastes tvT gets from consuming x private goods and a vector y of public goods while in coalition s under assignment A is: †
u t (x, y, A, s)=x−E(A(i))+h t (y, CP(A, s)).
Note we use the convention that each agent pays his own education costs. Thus, x, gross consumption, is divided between net consumption of private good and educational expenditures. We make no restrictions on utility functions other than quasi-linearity. In particular, continuity, convexity and monotonicity are not required. ‡ † Since by construction only the crowding profile of an agent's coalition affects his utility, we do not need to assume that preferences satisfy taste anonymity in consumption as we have in previous papers using the crowding types model. Similarly, we do not need to assume separately that production satisfies taste anonymity in production. See, for example, Conley and Wooders (1995a) for more details.
‡ The results we show in this paper can be extended to more general economies, for example, general ordinal preference and many private goods as in Wooders (1993a, b) for example. We choose the current simple framework to focus on the new results rather than technical generality.
Crowding also affects production. The production technology, commonly available to all, is given by the cost function f:
is interpreted as the cost in terms of private good of producing a vector y of public goods for coalition s under assignment A.
A feasible state of the economy, (X, Y, A, S), is a partition S of the population, an assignment A of agents to crowding types, an allocation X=(x 1 , . . ., x I ) of private goods, and a set of public good production plans Y=(y 1 , . . .,
We denote the set of feasible states by F. We will also say that (x, ȳ) is a feasible allocation for a coalition s under assignment Ā if
A coalition svS producing a feasible allocation (x, ȳ) under as-
where ivs k vS in the original feasible state. A feasible state (X, Y, A, S)vF is in the core of the economy if it cannot be improved upon by any coalition.
Taste-homogeneity and the core
We now turn our attention to economies in which small groups are effective. Small group effectiveness, introduced in Wooders (1978 Wooders ( , 1979 , means that all or almost all gains to collective activities can be realized by groups bounded in absolute or relative size. ‡ An economy satisfies strict small group effectiveness (SGE), if there exists a positive integer B such that:
(1) for all core states (X, Y, A, S) and all s k vS, it holds that %s k %≤B; (2) for all tvT, it holds that %{ivI| (i)=t}%>B. † Since agents are assumed to have quasi-linear preferences, this is equivalent to requiring that no one agent be made better off, while keeping other agents at least as well off.
‡ The relationship between several forms of small group effectiveness is shown in Wooders (1994a) and a number of results using this condition are surveyed.
The first condition says that any state which includes at least one jurisdiction with more than B agents can be improved upon. In other words, coalitions larger than B do strictly worse than coalitions with B agents or fewer. The second condition says that there are at least B agents of each type in the economy. This is a relatively strong formalized version of the sixth assumption in Tiebout's original paper. Alternative definitions of strict small group effectiveness include assuming that all feasible utility vectors can be realized with partitions of the agents into jurisdictions containing no more than B members, or that for sufficiently large replications of the economy further replications do not increase per capita utilities. A less restrictive version, small group effectiveness, would require that groups bounded in size are able to achieve all or almost all per capita gains. More formally, given any epsilon greater than zero, there is an integer B( ) such that groups can be constrained to be of size less than or equal to B( ) with a loss due to this constraint of at most per capita. In large games, if sufficiently many agents of each type appear in the economy, this form of SGE is equivalent to the mild condition that per capita payoffs are bounded, introduced in Wooders (1980a) . † Given this, our view is that the choice of form of SGE is largely a matter of convenience and so we choose a version that contributes to the simplicity of our proofs.
Our first theorem shows that SGE implies that all agents of a given type are equally treated in the core. 
In other words, there are at least two agents of the same type who † For large games with side payments, Wooders (1979) shows that a form of strict small group effectiveness implies non-emptiness of approximate cores of large games, convergence of approximate cores to competitive outcomes, and the symmetry (the equal treatment of equals) property of the core. Wooders (1980) obtains versions of the same results under the assumption of per capita boundedness. These results are all reported in Wooders (1994a) . See Wooders (1994b) for the relationship between SGE and per capita boundedness and Wooders (1994a) for the relationships between several forms of strict SGE and SGE.
are not equally treated and who are members of different coalitions in the partition S. We claim this is not possible in a core state. To see this, consider the coalition so{s k /i}jî. Note that the allocation (x, ȳ) where ȳ=y k , for agent ī, x î =x k i , and for all jvs such that j≠î, x j =x k j , is feasible under assignment Ā , where for agent ī, Ā (î)= A(î) and for all jvs such that j≠î, Ā (j)=A(j). In other words, the coalition s is formed by replacing agent i with agent î and the allocation (x, ȳ) of s is identical to (x k , y k ) except that agent î is given agent i's allocation of private good, and takes agent i's crowding type assignment. This is feasible since by construction, CP(s)=CP(s k ). Note, therefore, that for all jvs such that j≠î,
and for agent î
In other words, all agents in s are at least as well off, and agent î is strictly better off. Then, since all agents have quasi-linear preferences it is possible to redistribute some of agent î's gain to the other agents in s and leave all agents strictly better off. This improves upon (X, Y, A, S), which contradicts the hypothesis. Ε Next, we show that under small group effectiveness the net contribution that each agent makes to public goods production (his endowment less his consumption of private good and educational expenditure) is the same for all agents in a given coalition regardless of which crowding type an agent chooses. In other words, agents are compensated for their educational expenditure to the degree that all agents in a given coalition are indifferent over all possible choices of crowding type. Otherwise, there would be an incentive for agents to choose different crowding type assignments. 
Proof: Suppose not. Then, without loss of generality, suppose
By SGE there exists an agent īvs k such that s k ≠s k and (ī)= (î)= tvT. By Theorem 1 we know that
Let Ā be an assignment that is identical to A in all respects except that Ā (ī)=A(i 
In addition,
But since
it follows that
By construction, the crowding profiles are the same in these two coalitions, and as a result, so are the total educational expenditures. We conclude that:
Thus, the coalition s collects a surplus of private good after it pays for public goods production. This surplus can be redistributed to agents in s in a way that leaves them strictly better off. This improves upon (X, Y, A, S), which contradicts the hypothesis. Ε
We note as an aside that as Theorem 1 implies that each agent of type t gets the same utility level, U t , this can be taken as a "wage" paid to the agents due to his taste type. This in turn implies that no additional net "wage" is paid to an agent of a given type because of their choice of crowding type. We see in Lemma 1 that the difference in net contribution to public goods production between agents who choose different crowding types exactly offsets the difference in educational costs. Thus, a very strong form of hedonic independence holds in this model. Since all crowding characteristics are equally available to all agents, competition between agents causes the net wage paid for choosing a particular crowding characteristic to be driven to zero. The utility each agent receives in the core is due solely to his tastes, and so is clearly independent of the crowding type he ends up choosing. This is in contrast to models in which crowding type is exogenous. The taste and crowding characteristics are not generally hedonically independent in this case. See Conley and Wooders (1996b) for a formal definition of hedonic independence and further discussion.
Our main result in this section is that there is no advantage to mixing several types of agent in a single jurisdiction, although, as we point out in the introduction, it may be the case that tasteheterogeneous coalitions do exactly as well as taste-homogeneous coalitions. Formally, a state (X, Y, A, S) is said to satisfy strong essential taste-homogeneity (SET) under the following conditions. SET: For all taste types tvT and every jurisdiction s k vS in a core partition containing at least one agent i such that (i)=t, and for every alternative jurisdiction svS where (ī)=t for all īvs, there exists an assignment Ā vA such that CP(A, s k )=CP(Ā , s), and a feasible allocation (x, ȳ) for s such that for all îvs:
where îvs k vS in the original partition.
In other words, a state is strongly essentially taste-homogeneous if, when we choose any type tvT that is represented in a given coalition s k and form a new coalition s by replacing all agents not of type t with agents who are of this type, then choosing crowding type assignments such that the crowding profile of the s k is the same as the crowding profile of s, it is possible to make all the agents in the s just as well off as they were in the original state. More succinctly, it is possible to "homogenize" any coalition along any set of tastes that are currently represented in the coalition without any loss of utility.
Theorem 2:
The core of an economy that satisfies SGE is strongly essentially taste-homogeneous.
Proof:
We must show for every core state (X, Y, A, S) that for all taste types tvT and every jurisdiction s k vS in the core partition containing at least one agent i such that (i)=t, and for every alternative jurisdiction svS with the same crowding profile where (ī)=t for all īvs, there exists an assignment Ā such that CP(A, s k )= CP(Ā , s) and a feasible allocation (x, ȳ) for s such that for all îvs:
where îvs k vS in the original partition. Let s be a taste-homogeneous coalition that satisfies the conditions above, and let Ā be any assignment such that CP(A, s k )= CP(Ā , s). By Lemma 1, all agents in a given coalition in a core state make the same net contribution to public goods production. Formally, we denote this net contribution as zo ( j ) −x j −E(A(j)) for all jvs k . Consider the allocation (x, ȳ) where ȳ=y k , and for all jvs, x j = t −z+E(Ā (j)). Note that by construction, coalitions s and s k have the same crowding profile, and produce the same level of public good, and collect the same total contributions from its members. It follows that (x, ȳ) is feasible for s under assignment Ā . It only remains to show that all agents in s are at least as well off with allocation (x, ȳ) as they were in the original core state. Suppose instead that for some agent îvs such that in the original core state îvs
Recall that by hypothesis, there exists an agent ivs k such that (i)=t, and so by Theorem 1,
Thus,
Anonymous decentralization and core equivalence
In Conley and Wooders (1995) we define a set of anonymous admission prices that allow the core states to be decentralized. Such a price system gives an admission price that an agent of any given crowding type must pay to join a coalition with every possible crowding profile and for every possible public good level. Since we are only interested in decentralizing the core in this paper and by SGE the core consists only of coalitions of size B or smaller, we will restrict attention to systems that give prices only for coalitions that satisfy this requirement. Such a restriction is not strictly necessary given the strength of our SGE assumption; however, it simplifies proofs. Formally:
No nvR C + cvC n c ≤B and !cvC, n c is an integer .
In addition, it makes sense to provide prices only for those coalitions that it is feasible for an agent who chooses a given crowding type to join. For example, if a coalition with crowding profile n includes no agents of crowding type c (n c =0), then there is no reason to specify an admission price for agents with crowding type c to this type of coalition. † More formally, let N c denote a set of vectors, whose components, all non-negative integers, sum to no more than B:
A price system for crowding type c is given by a mapping:
where c (y, n) is interpreted as the price that an agent who chooses to be crowding type c would have to pay to join a coalition producing public good levels y and having a crowding profile n. Note that this price system is anonymous in the sense that it depends only on the observable characteristics of agents (crowding types) and not on unobservable characteristics (tastes). A Tiebout admission price system is simply the collection of price systems for each crowding type and is denoted by .
A Tiebout equilibrium is a feasible state (X, Y, A, S)vF and a price system such that:
(1) For all s k vS, all individuals ivs k , all alternative crowding profiles n vN, all alternative crowding assignments Ā and for all levels of public good production ȳvR
. † We emphasize that this does not mean that the price system excludes the possibility of coalitions with crowding profile n plus one agent of crowding type c. Such a coalition would have a crowding profile n , where for all cvC such that c≠c, n c =n c and n c =1. Coalitions with crowding profile n would, of course, have an admission price defined for agents of crowding type c.
(2) For all potential jurisdictions crowding profiles n vN and public good levels ȳvR
Condition (1) says that all agents maximize utility over jurisdiction type, public goods level and crowding assignments. Condition (2) requires that given the price system, no firm can make positive profits by entering the market and offering to provide any sort of jurisdiction. Condition (3) requires that all equilibrium jurisdictions make zero profit, and so cover their costs. † The next theorem shows that all equilibrium states are also core states. An immediate corollary is that there is a first welfare theorem for the Tiebout equilibrium. Proof: Suppose not. Then the Tiebout equilibrium state can be improved upon by some jurisdiction svS, providing an allocation (x, ȳ) which is feasible under assignment Ā . Consider an arbitrary agent ivs, where (i)=t. Suppose that in the Tiebout equilibrium state, i is a member of the jurisdiction s k i vS. By definition, in the Tiebout equilibrium state, agent i's consumption of private good is
Suppose that jurisdiction s forms and agents pay admission prices given by the Tiebout pricing system instead of receiving the consumption levels they are assigned in the improving allocation. Denote these "Tiebout" consumption levels by s) ). † Sergiu Hart has pointed out to us that Condition (3) is implied by Condition (2) and the definition of feasibility. We state Condition (3) because we wish to emphasize that equilibrium jurisdictions make zero profit, and thus that club formation is competitive.
Since (X, Y, A, S) is a Tiebout state and by Condition (1) of the definition of the Tiebout equilibrium agents maximize utility under given Tiebout prices, we know that:
Substituting and summing over all such agents ivs yields
But by the definition of improving the coalition, for all ivs,
or equivalently,
Summing this over agents in s yields
This implies that,
which allows us to conclude:
However, by the definition of improving jurisdictions, it holds that
By the definition of a Tiebout equilibrium, it holds that
These two together imply
In Conley and Wooders (1995a) we showed that all core states could be decentralized with anonymous admission prices. While it is of some interest to show that this result can be extended to a model with educational choice, the structure of the model allows us to say considerably more about the nature of prices. When crowding types are exogenous, we could only show the existence of decentralizing prices, but we could not say very much about their form. In general, they could be any (possibly non-linear, nonconvex or even discontinuous) function that mapped public good levels and crowding profiles into the real numbers. We are able to show that the addition of an endogenous choice of crowding types implies that prices depend in a very specific way on two factors. Specifically, the next theorem demonstrates that the following price system decentralizes the core:
These prices say that all agents pay an equal share of the cost of the public good, and in addition, only have to pay the average educational costs of the coalition they join. The first part is a special case of the cost share equilibrium. If it happens we have constant returns to scale, then these cost shares are equal linear cost shares, and given that the core is taste-homogeneous, the equilibrium prices are Lindahl prices within jurisdictions. This is an interesting contrast to Conley and Wooders (1995c) in which we show that the possibility of such linear decentralization depends not only on the constant returns to scale of the production technology, but also on crowding being anonymous. It may be that making the crowding type endogenous makes crowding anonymous in a Rawlsian "behind the veil" sense; before agents choose an assignment, they all have the same crowding potential. It is also interesting to compare this work to Weber and Wiesmeth (1992) who study equivalence of cost share equilibrium to the core in a pure public goods context. The main difference seems to be that we get equal cost shares due to the taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in our model, while in the Weber and Wiesmeth model with pure public goods, all agents of all types are in one jurisdiction and so the cost shares are not generally equal. Since revenue equals cost for all equilibrium and potential jurisdictions, it follows that for all potential crowding profiles n vN and all public good levels ȳvR
and for all s k vS,
It only remains to show that it is optimal for agents to choose to participate in the core state under these prices. Suppose instead that for some individual ivs k vS where (i)=t, there exists a crowding profile n vN, a crowding assignment Â vA and levels of public good production ȳvR L + such that
First, we claim that agent ivI who is of type tvT is indifferent over all possible choices of crowding type represented in the crowding profile n , given that he joins such a coalition. Formally, we must show that for all c, ĉvC such that n c >0 and n ĉ >0, it holds that Subtracting the common terms and substituting it for prices, this is equivalent to showing:
, which is obviously true. Consider a coalition s consisting of cvC n c agents of type t. By construction of the price system, only coalitions with B or fewer agents are available through the markets to agents, we know that cvC n c ≤B, and by SGE there are at least B agents of type t. It follows that s is a feasible jurisdiction. Let Ā vA be any assignment such that CP(Ā , s)=n . Since we have already shown that agents of type t are indifferent over all possible crowding type assignments under the proposed prices when they join the jurisdiction s, and by Lemma 1, all agents are of type t and are equally treated in the core, we know that for all jvs,
Since we show above that the costs of the public goods are covered under these prices, the allocation is feasible for s and this coalition improves upon the core state (X, Y, A, S), a contradiction. We conclude that under these prices, costs are covered, profits are non-positive and agents can do no better than by choosing to participate in the core state. Therefore, these prices decentralized the core. Ε
It is an immediate corollary of Theorem 3 and 4 that the core and equilibrium are equivalent.
Conclusions
Making a formal distinction between the tastes of agents and their external crowding effects allows us to address some long-standing questions in local public economics. Most importantly, it makes it possible to confirm Tiebout's assertion that efficient allocations can be decentralized through anonymous prices even when crowding is differentiated. It also creates some new questions. In the crowding types model, it is possible to form coalitions that take advantage of the full array of crowding effects while segregating agents according to tastes. Both our intuition and everyday experiences suggest that such taste-homogeneous coalitions should be able to out-perform any taste-heterogeneous coalition with the same crowding profile. It is surprising, therefore, that not only is this not true in general, but that it may indeed be generically false. Only when crowding types appear in exactly the right proportion can we be assured that taste-homogeneous coalitions will be optimal.
The main difference between this paper and our previous work is that we make crowding type an endogenous variable. Modelling crowding type as an exogenous characteristic of agents is a significant restriction which limits its interpretation to things like genetic endowments and external effects resulting from irreversible choices. Allowing crowding type to be endogenous opens the model up to a much richer set of interpretations. The most interesting in our opinion is to think of crowding type as representing the skills that agents acquire as a result of their educational investment choices. We show that in such an environment market forces cause agents to choose the various types of skills in exactly the proportions that imply that the optimal coalitions will be essentially tastehomogeneous. Thus, to the degree that agents choose their crowding characteristics in response to market signals, agents will find it advantageous to segregate according to taste even when crowding is differentiated.
We also show that the core and equilibrium are equivalent when crowding type is endogenous and that decentralization is possible with anonymous prices. This conflicts with results for the standard differentiated crowding model in which decentralizing prices must be non-anonymous, but agrees with the results for the crowding types model. The endogeneity of crowding types, however, lets us say more about the structure of the price system than we were able to say in the exogenous case. Specifically, we show that, net an agent's own educational costs, each agent pays exactly the average cost of public goods production plus the average of all of his fellow members' education costs when they join a particular jurisdiction. This is a highly intuitive result. It says that agents who spend a lot on education must be compensated by agents who economize so that in the end, all agents pay the same net education costs. In addition, all agents pay an equal share of the cost of producing public goods. Since the core is essentially tastehomogeneous, this is equivalent to what they would pay at a Lindahl equilibrium. This paper makes a number of simplifying assumptions in order to make the proofs transparent and highlight the new results this model provides. Obtaining asymptotic versions of these results with the model generalized to many private goods and ordinal preferences appears to be primarily a technical exercise. This is especially true in view of the fact that convergence of approximate cores to equilibrium outcomes in economies with local public goods has already been shown (cf. Wooders, 1980b Wooders, , 1993a .
We have focused on the core. It has been well known since Pauly (1970) that cores of economies with local public goods may be empty. In fact, for economies in general, except under certain stylized conditions, cores are typically empty. The rationale for our interest in the core is that, in large economies with small effective groups, approximate cores are typically non-empty, are approximately symmetric, † and approximate cores converge to equilibrium payoffs. ‡ Thus we assume for our results, that there † That is, most agents of each type are treated approximately equally in terms of the payoffs that they receive.
‡ See Wooders (1980a Wooders ( , 1983 , Wooders and Zame (1984) and other papers for non-emptiness of approximate cores, Wooders (1980a Wooders ( , 1994a for the equal treatment property of the core and asymptotic equal treatment, and Wooders (1980a) , Wooders and Zame (1987) for convergence of approximate cores. These results are surveyed in Wooders (1994a) . Kannai (1992) presents further discussion.
is some state of the economy in the core. If there is a cost of coalition formation, or some ''market friction'', then given a jurisdiction structure, improving coalitions may have to pay a cost of forming and thus not be able to achieve the same payoffs as identical coalitions in the given jurisdiction structure. Under this definition of the core Wooders (1988) shows that with ordinal preferences, large economies with small effective groups where improving coalitions must pay a set-up cost have non-empty cores. † There are several substantive ways that this model might be generalized. We have assumed that all agents face the same educational costs. Agents we commonly observe, however, may face vastly different costs of acquiring skills. Different people have different aptitudes. This could be addressed by including a second characteristic in the definition of agents (in addition to an agent's tastes) which we might call ''ability''. Educational costs would then depend both on an agents ability and the educational choice. We have also assumed that agent's care only about the crowding profile of the jurisdiction they join, and not about the particular skill they end up choosing. Clearly, people care a great deal about the type of work they do. This observation could be incorporated into the model by generalizing the preference function to include the agent's choice. It is not immediately clear how these two modifications would effect the results in this paper.
